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E-FILED CNMI SUPERIOR COURT

E-filed: Jan 23 2024 03:23PM Clerk Review: Jan 23 2024 03:23PM Filing ID: 71850839

Case Number: 21-0091-CV

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE

BANK OF SAIPAN,) CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-0091
Plaintiff,) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF
v.	 BANK OF SAIPAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF LATE CHARGES,
NOIME B. LIFOIFOI and ALLAN AGUON LIFOIFOI,) UNPAID INTEREST, AND PRINCIPAL) AMOUNT BECAUSE DEFENDANT) ALLAN AGUON LIFOIFOI'S
Defendants.	 FIFTEEN-YEAR PRISON SENTENCE WAS A FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCE OF HIS CRIME

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER came before the Court on September 5, 2023, at 2:30 p.m., in Courtroom 220A for a hearing on Bank of Saipan's ("Plaintiff Bank of Saipan") Motion for Summary Judgment. Michael A. White, Esq. appeared for Plaintiff, and Joseph E. Horey, Esq. appeared for Allan Aguon Lifoifoi ("Defendant Allan or "Allan"). Noime B. Lifoifoi did not appear.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- On July 10, 2018, Allan and his wife Noime borrowed \$13,000.00 from Plaintiff Bank of Saipan.
- 2. Defendants Allan and his wife Noime B. Lifoifoi agreed to repay the loan with monthly payments of \$361.99.
- 3. The loan provided for 15% interest per annum.

- 4. On June 11, 2020, Allan was arrested and charged with sexual abuse of a minor. Defendant Allan has been incarcerated since then. After pleading guilty, he was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, and the sentence will conclude on June 11, 2035.
- 5. Among other conditions, Allan is not permitted to work. His sentence specifically provides that it is "without the possibility of parole, early release, work release or furlough." See *Commonwealth v. Lifoifoi*, Crim. No. 20-0088, Judgment and Commitment Order (November 5, 2020) at 4 ¶ 1. See also NMIAC § 57-20.1-1730 ("Any prisoner incarcerated for a crime which involved . . . sexual contact . . . shall not be eligible for work release, educational leave or furlough under any conditions.").
- 6. Defendants Allan and Noime B. Lifoifoi paid a total of \$4,493.79 toward the loan. The last payment was made on September 24, 2020.
- 7. Initially Defendant Allan disputed the amount owed to Bank of Saipan and the 15% interest rate computed by Plaintiff.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

- 8. On March 29, 2021, Plaintiff Bank of Saipan filed this action.
- 9. On April 29, 2021 Defendants Allan and Noime B. Lifoifoi were served the complaint.
- 10. On May 24, 2021, Defendant Allan filed an Answer.
- 11. On October 23, 2021, an Entry of Default was issued in favor of Plaintiff Bank of Saipan and against Noime B. Lifoifoi.
- 12. On October 23, 2021, a Default Judgment was issued in favor of Plaintiff Bank of Saipan and against Noime B. Lifoifoi¹.

¹ As of the issuance of this order there is nothing in the file that Plaintiff Bank of Saipan has made collection attempts on the Default Judgment against Defendant Noime B. Lifoifoi.

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- 13. On April 25, 2022, Defendant Allan filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause or Referral to Mediation. Plaintiff Bank of Saipan and Defendant Allan were not able to reach a settlement.
- 14. On June 27, 2023, Plaintiff Bank of Saipan filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
- 15. On August 18, 2023, Defendant Allan filed an Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
- 16. On August 28, 2023, Plaintiff Bank of Saipan responded with a Reply.
- 17. On November 27, 2023, the Court issued an order titled Request for Parties to Submit Updated Calculations of the Applicable Interest Rate.
- On December 18, 2023, Plaintiff Bank of Saipan filed a Response to the November 27, 2023 Order.
- 19. On January 5, 2024, Defendant Allan filed a Response to Plaintiff's Computations.
- 20. On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff Bank of Saipan filed a Reply.
- 21. On January 16, 2024, the Court held a hearing on the updated calculations. Based on the filing and representation by Defendant Allan, there is no dispute of the calculated principal sum of \$11,928.25 that Defendant Allan owes Plaintiff Bank of Saipan.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary Judgment

The court must grant summary judgment if the moving party shows there is no genuine dispute to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. NMI R. Civ. P. Rule 56(a). The moving party must identify each part of the claim on which summary judgment is sought. Id. If the moving party will bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, then the movant "can only meet its burden on summary judgment by presenting affirmative evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact —

that is, facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial." *Parrott v. PNC Bank*, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2013). "Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion is insufficient, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented." *Id.* (emphasis in original) (quoting *Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970)).

V. DISCUSSION

Defendants Allan and Noime B. Lifoifoi received a loan for \$13,000 from the Bank of Saipan on July 10, 2018. The Defendants defaulted on those payments. Since June 11, 2020, Defendant Allan stopped making payments due to being incarcerated. Noime B. Lifoifoi stopped making payments on September 24, 2020, and an Entry of Default and Default Judgment has since been entered against her.

Plaintiff Bank of Saipan has requested the arrears and future payments from Defendant Allan. Defendant Allan argues that based on temporary impracticability, he cannot continue payments while incarcerated because his sentencing does not allow for work release. Defendant Allan argues it is only temporary since his sentence is for fifteen years. Defendant Allan asserts that interest on the loan should be paused or tolled until the end of his sentence when he is released and able to pay the loan payments.

Temporary Impracticability

In Defendant Allan's sentencing order, it states that he is ineligible for work release. *Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. Allan Aguon Lifoifoi*, Criminal Case No. 20-0088, (NMI Super. Ct. Nov 5, 2020) (Judgment of Conviction and Commitment Order at 4) (Naraja, PJ). Defendant Allan pled guilty to two counts of sexual abuse of a minor and was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. Defendant Allan argues that the sentencing order

prevents him from continuing his duty to perform and has made it impracticable to make payments while incarcerated. "The doctrine of impossibility of performance provides that if a party's performance is rendered 'impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged." *Store SPE LA Fitness v. Fitness Int'l*, *LLC*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141913 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts §261). (emphasis in bold). Specifically, Defendant Allan's ineligibility for work release is the impracticability not that he committed a crime. It is the sentencing order prohibiting his ability to make money to pay the loan every month. Plaintiff Bank of Saipan disagrees stating Defendant Allan caused his imprisonment so it was his fault, rendering impossibility or impracticability inapplicable. Reply to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2. There is also no evidence showing that the contracting parties assumed that this would or would not occur. Id.

However, Defendant Allan argues that the impracticability is temporary until June 11, 2035, when Defendant Allan is released. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 2. "Impracticability of performance or frustration of purpose that is only temporary suspends the obligor's duty to perform while the impracticability or frustration exists but does not discharge his duty or prevent it from arising[.]" Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 269. Defendant Allan claims that finding fault is not applicable for temporary impracticability. Defendant Allan states that his prison sentence is temporary, but fifteen years is a considerable amount of time for the Plaintiff Bank of Saipan to wait for Defendant Allan's payments. Temporary alludes to a short period. Black's Law Dictionary defines temporary as "lasting for a time only; existing or continuing for a limited (usu. short) time; transitory." Black's Law Dictionary

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(7th ed. 1999). ² "Courts have uniformly refused to find impossibility where the difficulty has been caused by the promisor or where the difficulty was preventable by the promisor." Taylor-Edwards Warehouse & Transfer Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 715 F.2d 1330, 1336 (1983). Defendant Allan created the impracticability by his actions, preventing him from continuing his duty to perform. Defendant Allan created the situation that he now claims is preventing him from fulfilling his obligation to make payments on the loan. See, Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 128 F. Supp. 311, 324 (N.D. Ala. 1954). Defendant Allan has not provided statute or caselaw stating that interest be paused or tolled on the loan while a person is incarcerated. Defendant Allan argues that his current situation was not foreseeable at the time of contracting. "The ultimate inquiry for purposes of the impossibility defense is whether the intervening changes of circumstance were so unforeseeable that the risk of increased difficulty or expense should not properly be borne by the promisor." Mull v. Motion Picture Indus. Health Plan, 41 F.4th 1120, 1131 (citing Taylor-Edwards Warehouse & Transfer Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 715 F.2d 1330, 1336 (9th Cir. 1983)). By committing a crime, a person knows or should know that a possible consequence of being found guilty or pleading guilty to a crime is imprisonment. It was not unforeseeable at the time of contracting and it was not unforeseeable when Defendant Allan pled guilty. As Plaintiff Bank of Saipan noted, there is no evidence showing the non-occurrence of Defendant Allan going to prison was a basic assumption of the contract. "The mere fact that a contract's performance becomes more difficult or expensive than originally anticipated, does not justify setting it aside." Liner v. Armstrong Homes, 19 Wash.App. 921, 926 (1978) (citing Westland Constr. Co., Inc. v. Chris Berg, Inc., 35 Wn.2d 824, (1950)).

² "Impossibility, impracticability and frustration of purpose are, as a practical matter, variations on the same theme and often treated interchangeably by courts." Impossibility, Impracticability and Frustration of Purpose in the Age of COVID-19 (americanbar.org); See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 261, *comment d*.

Defendant also argues that allowing the accrual of interest during the fifteen-year prison sentence would be a monetary penalty for his offense. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. Here, the Court is not penalizing Defendant Allan nor is Plaintiff Bank of Saipan penalizing Defendant. By signing the Note and Security Agreement, Defendant Allan promised to pay the loan amounts based on the payment schedule, including any late charges, and any interest on the unpaid balances. Plaintiff Bank of Saipan expected Defendant Allan to make his payments diligently or suffer late charges and interest on unpaid balances. Defendant Allan likewise signed and agreed. Defendant Allan's non-payment would have resulted in late charges and interest on any unpaid balances whether he became unemployed, went to prison, or simply refused to make payments.

Based on the filings and representation by Defendant Allan, there is no dispute of the calculated principal sum of \$11,928.25 that Defendant Allan owes Plaintiff Bank of Saipan. There is no genuine dispute of a material fact. The central question revolves around whether the Plaintiff has a legal entitlement. While Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 269 does not include finding fault, an impracticability within itself alludes to a supervening event preventing the injured party from performing an obligation. As stated before, Defendant Allan's imprisonment was not unforeseen. In addition to pleading guilty, the act of committing a crime inherently carries the risk of being convicted and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment, which entails certain restrictions such as the prohibition of work release. Although Defendant Allan's imprisonment is not permanent, a duration of fifteen years is not conducive to considering it as "temporary" to exempt him from fulfilling his obligation. The Court finds that Defendant Allan's imprisonment and inability to work during his imprisonment is not a temporary impracticability. Defendant Allan's obligation to pay which includes late charges, unpaid interest, and the principal sum under the Note and Security Agreement is not suspended.

VI. CONCLUSION

Because Defendant Allan Aguon Lifoifoi's fifteen-year prison sentence was a
foreseeable consequence of his crime, his obligation to pay late charges, unpaid interest, and
the principal sum under the Note and Security Agreement is not suspended. THEREFORE,
Plaintiff Bank of Saipan's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED .

SO ORDERED this 23^{rd} day of January, 2024.

JOSEPH N. CAMACHO, Associate Judge