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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

ALEXANDRIA DAVIS STEELEY,

Petitioner,

VS.

CNMI DEPARTMENT OF LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DLNR); CNMI DIVISION OF FISH & WILDLIFE (DFW); SYLVAN IGISOMAR, Secretary, DLNR; and MANNY PANGELINAN, Director, DFW,

ORDER GRANTING COMMONWEALTH'S MOTION TO DISMISS

CIVIL CASE NO. 23-0146

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER came before the Court on September 19, 2023 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 223A, CNMI Superior Court, Guma' Hustisia for oral argument on the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands' (the "Commonwealth") Motion to Dismiss Petitioner Alexandria Davis Steeley's ("Petitioner") Complaint for Review of Agency Action, for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, and Damages (the "Petition"). The Court also heard oral argument on the two government officials' – Respondent Sylvan Igisomar and Respondent Manny Pangelinan, in their personal capacities – Motions to Dismiss Petitioner's Second Cause of Action Based on Qualified Immunity.

Petitioner was represented by her attorney, Jeanne H. Rayphand. The Commonwealth, by and through Respondent CNMI Department of Lands and Natural Resources ("DLNR"), was represented by Assistant Attorney General Hunter Hunt. Respondent Sylvan Igisomar ("Igisomar"), Secretary of DLNR, was represented by Assistant Attorney General Gregory Cenac. Respondent Manny Pangelinan ("Pangelinan"), Director of the Department of Fish and Wildlife ("DFW"), was represented by Assistant Attorney General Joshua Willis.

1		Based upon a review of the arguments, filings, and relevant law, and for the reasons stated
2	herein	, the Court <u>GRANTS</u> the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss the Petition.
3		II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
4	1.	The underlying controversy centers on Petitioner's applications, filed February 10, 2023, for
5		permits and clearance from the CNMI Division of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") and the
6		Division of Fish and Wildlife ("DFW").
7	2.	Petitioner is legally required to obtain both the DEQ permit and DFW authorization before she
8		may lawfully clear vegetation and rebuild a home situated on property located in Kagman,
9		Saipan.
10	3.	During its review of Petitioner's application, DFW detected a Nightingale Reed-warbler within
11		the buffer zone area around Petitioner's property and gave notice to Petitioner, on or about
12		March 31, 2023, that the permit process had been halted for further investigation and/or
13		resolution.
14	4.	On May 15, 2023, DFW assessed the amount for a partial credit of money to be paid by
15		Petitioner to the Saipan Upland Mitigation Bank ("SUMB") to mitigate damage to the
16		Nightingale Reed-warbler's habitat.
17	5.	On July 27, 2023, Petitioner filed her Complaint for Review of Agency Action, for Declaratory
18		Judgment, Injunctive Relief, and Damages against DLNR, DFW, Respondent Igisomar (in both
		his official capacity as Secretary of DLNR and in his personal capacity), and Respondent
19		Pangelinan (in both his official capacity as Director of DFW and in his personal capacity).
20	6.	On or about August 9, 2023, DLNR transmitted notice of an Authorization for SUMB Credit
21		Sale to Petitioner.
22	7.	Petitioner has not paid, and apparently – as argued in Court – does not want (or intend) to pay
23		the SUMB mitigation fee to receive the necessary permits that would allow her to clear her
24		property in Kagman and rebuild a home on it.
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- 8. On August 22, 2023, the Commonwealth filed its Motion to Correct Misjoinder and Motion 1 to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim on Which Relief Can Be 2 Granted. 3 9. Respondent Igisomar and Respondent Pangelinan thereafter joined the Commonwealth's 4 Motion to Dismiss and also filed separate Motions to Dismiss the claims against them in their 5 individual capacities. 6 10. On October 2, 2023, this Court granted Respondent Igisomar's and Respondent Pangelinan's 7 Motions to Dismiss the claims filed against them in their individual capacities by separate 8 Order of the Court. 9 11. The Court now issues its ruling on the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss the Petition. 10 III. LEGAL STANDARD 11 The Commonwealth Rules of Procedure for Administrative Appeals, in conjunction with the 12 Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure, govern the specific procedures and processes to be used in 13 the Superior Court for judicial review of CNMI agency decisions that were made under the 14 Administrative Procedures Act. See generally NMI R. P. Admin. App. and specifically NMI R. P. 15 Admin. App. 2(g) ("All motions are governed by the Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure except 16 where the rules contained herein conflict or state otherwise, in which case these rules govern."). 17 The Commonwealth's Administrative Procedure Act allows for judicial review of "final 18 agency action[s]." 1 CMC § 9112(d); see also NMI R. P. Admin. App. 1(a) (providing that the rules 19 are meant to govern procedures for judicial review of "final orders or decisions from an agency") 20 (emphasis added). Final agency action is therefore a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review. 21 Cody v. N. Mar. I. Ret. Fund, 2011 MP 16 ¶ 10; see also ANAKS Ocean View Hill Homeowners Ass'n 22 v. Inos, 2023 MP 1 ¶ 20 ("Finality is a jurisdictional requirement for any appeal of an agency action."). 23 An aggrieved party must seek judicial review within thirty days of a final agency action. Cody, 2011
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MP 16 ¶ 18 (citing 1 CMC § 9112(a)-(b)).

IV. DISCUSSION

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2	Petitioner seeks judicial review of agency action she claims was too slow and asks the Court			
3	to declare that Respondents "unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed" a final agency decision			
4	on her application for certain land clearing permits. To remedy this delay, Petitioner asks that the			
5	Court order DFW to issue her the necessary permit to clear her house lot and rebuild a house thereon.			
6	In the alternative, Petitioner asks this Court to declare that all Kagman homestead property			
7	owners are exempt from the Commonwealth's regulatory scheme with respect to land usage <u>and</u> the			
8	environmental regulations designed to protect endangered species in the CNMI, so that ultimately she			
9	may clear vegetation and rebuild a home on her homestead property in Kagman without obtaining any			
10	permits.			
11	Upon full review of the record, the moving papers, and counsel's arguments, the Court finds			
12	that: (i) the underlying appeal is not one of final agency action (and the delays complained of are not			
	unreasonable under the circumstances); and (ii) the alternative declaratory relief requested by			
13	Petitioner is somewhat extreme and, if granted, would constitute a violation of the separation of powers			
14	doctrine.			
15	A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because There Is No "Final Agency Action" to Review			
16	(and the Delays Complained of Are Not Unreasonable Under the Circumstances).			
17	Final agency action is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review. <i>Cody</i> , 2011 MP 16 ¶ 10;			
18	see also ANAKS, 2023 MP 1 \P 20 ("Finality is a jurisdictional requirement for any appeal of an agency			
19	action."). "[A]n aggrieved party must seek judicial review within thirty days of a <i>final agency action</i> ."			
	action. <i>j.</i> [23] aggreved party must seek judicial review within unity days of a <i>jinui ugency ucuon</i> .			

Cody, 2011 MP 16 ¶ 18 (citing 1 CMC § 9112(a)-(b)) (emphasis added).

21 Petitioner concedes in her Petition that there has been no final agency action taken on her 22 permit application. See Petition at 7. She asserts that this is because Respondents have "unlawfully 23 withheld and unreasonably delayed" taking action on her application and that she is therefore entitled to injunctive relief ordering DFW to promptly issue her the necessary permits. 24

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The Court agrees that there is no final agency action for this Court to review, but disagrees with Petitioner's claims that the agency actions in this case were unreasonable (or, that the delay entitles Petitioner to the injunctive relief requested). As noted in the facts above, Petitioner received the notice of DFW's Authorization for SUMB Credit Sale on August 9, 2023 and has since failed (or outright refused) to act on it. The application has basically sat in limbo ever since, as DFW cannot grant Petitioner's permit application until Petitioner accepts the fee for the SUMBA credits. Put another way, the ball has been in Petitioner's court for months.

Moreover, because Petitioner has not yet complied with the lawful process used in the CNMI to permit the clearing of property which may adversely affect threatened or endangered species, Respondents have been unable to issue a final decision on Petitioner's permit application. And without final agency action, this Court is deprived of jurisdiction over Petitioner's APA claim. Under these facts, the Court finds it appropriate to grant the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's first cause of action.

In addition, Petitioner's second cause of action, which is premised on the same alleged wrongdoing as her APA claim - i.e., Respondents' alleged failure to act on her permit application must be dismissed as well. As stated above, there is no unlawful withholding of agency action - and certainly none rising to the level of a constitutional violation - where DLNR has fulfilled its duty to notify Petitioner to pay the SUMB mitigation fee, and the decision now rests with Petitioner as to whether or not to accept the fee.

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B. Petitioner's Alternative Request for Relief, if Granted, Would Violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine.

As an alternative to Petitioner's request that this Court instruct DFW to give her the permit she wants, Petitioner asks the Court to declare that all Kagman homestead property owners are exempt from the environmental regulations promulgated by the CNMI government to protect critical habitats for endangered species. The Court simply does not have the power to do this.

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"The Commonwealth Constitution provides for a tripartite system of government," which "gives rise to the separation of powers doctrine." *Commonwealth v. Lot No. 218-5 R/W*, 9 N. Mar. I.

- 5 -

533, 535 (2016). "The separation of powers operates in a broad manner to confine legislative powers
to the legislature, executive powers to the executive, and those powers that are judicial in character to
the judiciary." *Id.* In other words, its purpose is "to safeguard the independence of each branch of the
government and protect it from domination and interference by the others." *Sablan v. Tenorio*, 4 N.
Mar. I. 351, 363.

Here, the CNMI government has unequivocally declared an interest in protecting endangered species and their special habitats. To achieve this important goal, our government promulgated certain regulations that all property owners must comply with if they wish to clear or build on land in the CNMI. What Petitioner asks for -i.e., a declaration that all Kagman homestead property owners are exempt from these environmental regulations – would require this Court to violate the separation of powers doctrine and interfere with the decision-making of a co-equal branch of government. The Court declines to do so. This Court's obligation is to *interpret* the law when faced with a case or controversy, not to change it.

For these reasons, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner's claims.
 Accordingly, the Petition is dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

THEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, the Court **GRANTS** the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss the Petition.

SO ORDERED this 27th day of October 2023.

/s/ WESLEY M. BOGDAN, Associate Judge