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7	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE		
8	COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS		
9	JOAQUIN M. MANGLONA ) Civil Action No.97-486		
10	Plaintiff,		
11	v. ) ORDER		
12	GOVERNMENT OF THE )		
13	COMMONWEALTH OF THE ) NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS )		
14	Defendant. )		
15	)		
16	I. INTRODUCTION		
17	Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction under Commonwealth Rule of		
18	Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(h) (3) came before this Court on July 9, 1997. The CNMI		
19	Government moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that this Court lacks subject		
20	matter jurisdiction over this claim because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies		
21	under section 5-201 of the CNMI Procurement Regulations, prior to filing the instant action.		
22	Assistant Attorney General Mike Ambrose, Esq., appeared on behalf of the CNMI Government.		
23	Douglas F. Cushnie, Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.		
24	Following the hearing, the Court issued an Order requesting additional briefing on the		
25	following issues:		
26	1. Do the CNMI Procurement Regulations set forth at 12 Com. Reg. No. 9 (September 15, 1990) 7274-7320 and especially § 5-201 apply to lease agreements for real property?		
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8 For Publication

2. If the CNMI Procurement Regulations set forth at 12 Com. Reg. No. 9 (September 15, 1990) 7274-7320 do apply to lease agreements for real property, can a landlord leasing real property to the CNMI Government be bound by the requirements of § 5-201 if the lease agreement does not include, and in fact contradicts, the dispute requirements set for in § 5-201? See, Order dated July 11, 1997.

Having considered the written and oral arguments of counsel, the Court now renders its decision.

### II. FACTS

In December 1992, the CNMI Government leased from Plaintiff office space for the Department of Labor and Immigration ("DLI") in Saipan. The building is located near the Saipan International Airport. The lease was for a period of ten years.

On January 22, 1997, the Secretary of Finance, Antonio R. Cabrera, wrote to Plaintiff notifying him that DLI had vacated the building and was terminating the lease.

On April 30, 1997, Secretary of Labor and Immigration, Thomas O. Sablan, wrote another lletter Plaintiff notifying him that DLI considered the lease terminated as of October, 1996 - the date DLI vacated the building. As grounds for terminating the lease, Secretary Sablan cited IPlaintiff's failure to keep the building in a state of repair sufficient to make it suitable as office space.

On May 6, 1997, Plaintiff filed the present action seeking, *inter* alia, the remaining rent allegedly due under the lease agreement in the amount of \$1,829,002.50.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not pursue administrative remedies under Section 5-201 of the CNMI Procurement Regulations.

### III ISSUE PRESENTED

Must a party to a lease agreement for real property with the CNMI Government exhaust a,dministrative remedies under section 5-201 of the CNMI Procurement Regulations prior to filing a lawsuit if the lease agreement, by its terms, does not require administrative remedy exhaustion.

#### IV. ANALYSIS

The Court begins its analysis by looking at the Lease Agreement executed by Plaintiff and the CNMI Government. The Lease Agreement provides:

16. Remedies of Landlord for Breach of Tenant: [I]n the event Tenant breaches this Lease and fails to make correction within the time provided, the Landlord may exercise any of the following remedies or any other remedy available to the Landlord at law or in equity, and all such remedies shall be cumulative and nonexclusive of any one or more such remedies, and exercise of one remedy shall not be deemed to be an exclusive election of the remedy or remedies exercised or a waiver of the remedies not exercised.

See, Lease Agreement at 9-10, Exhibit "A" to Plaintiffs Complaint.

In addition, the Lease Agreement provides:

25. Entire Agreement: This writing and the exhibits hereto contain the entire agreement of the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof, and may not be modified, altered, or changed in any manner whatsoever, except by written agreement signed by the parties hereto.

Id. at 15.

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The Lease Agreement does not require Plaintiff to seek administrative relief prior to filing a lawsuit in the event the CNMI Government breaches the Lease Agreement; thus any such duty must be imposed by statute or law.

Section 5-201 of the CNMI Procurement Regulations provides:

<u>Disputes:</u>(1) Any dispute between the government and a contractor relating to the performance, interpretation of or compensation due under a contract, which is subject of these regulations, must be filed in writing with the Chief and the official with the expenditure authority within ten (10) calendar days after knowledge of the facts surrounding the dispute.

Siee, CNMI Procurement Regulation § 5-201, 12 Com. Reg. No. 9 (September 15, 1990) 7274-7'320. (emphasis added) In order for the dispute requirements of the Procurement Regulations to apply, the contract in dispute must be "a contract which is the subject of these regulations." See Frocurement Regulations at § 5-201.

The Procurement Regulations define "Contract" to include:

. . . all types of agreements, regardless of what they may be called for the procurement of supplies, services or construction.

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See, Procurement Regulations § 1-201.5. Thus, in order for a lease of real property to be a contract subject to the dispute requirements of the Procurement Regulations, a lease for real property must be included in the definition of either supplies, services, or construction.

The Procurement Regulations do not define supplies. Furthermore, the definitions of services<sup>u</sup> and construction<sup>y</sup> do not include leases for real property. Consequently, a lease for real property is outside the scope of contracts in which administrative remedy exhaustion is required under section 5-201 of the Procurement Regulations.

The Government argues that the Procurement Regulations' definition of "goods" should be substituted for the word "services." *See Government's Supplemental* Brief at 5. *See also*, Procurement Regulations § 1-201.9.<sup>3</sup>/ As a basis for doing so, the Government offers this explanation:

We acknowledge that, at some places in the regulations, the term "supplies" is used instead of "goods", with apparently interchangeable meanings. This may be because the American Bar Association Model Procurement Code for State and Local Government (Public Contract Law Section 1979), which has many identical provisions to the CNMI Procurement Regulations and may have been a model for the CNMI, uses the term "supplies" instead of "goods". In that model code, there

Services means the furnishing of time, labor or effort by a person other than an employee, and not involving the delivery of a specific end product other than reports, plans and incidental documents.

See, Procurement Regulations § 1-201.18.

<sup>2</sup>/<sub>2</sub> Construction is defined as follows:

Construction means the process of building, altering, repairing, improving or demolishing of a public structure or building or public improvements commonly known as "capital improvements". It does not include the routine maintenance of existing structures, buildings, or public real property.

See, Procurement Regulations § 1-201.4.

<sup>3/</sup> Goods is defined as follows:

Goods means all property, including but not limited to equipment, materials, supplies, and other tangible personal property of any kind or nature, printing, insurance, leases of real and personal property, and sale or other disposal of real and personal property, except the sale or disposal of public lands under the management f the Marianas Public Land Corporation (MPLC).

See, Procurement Regulations § 1-201.9.

½ Services is defined as follows:

is a definition of "supplies" and not of "goods". In the CNMI Procurement Regulations, there is a definition of "goods" but not "supplies." The Model Code definition of "supplies", like the CNMI Procurement Regulation Definition of "goods", specifically includes "leases of real property. ABA Model Code at § 1-301(21). . . . While it would undoubtedly be neater if the same term was used in all places in the regulation, there can be no doubt that the inclusion of leases of real property in the definition of "goods" indicates the intent to include such leases in the coverage of the procurement regulations.

See Government's Supplemental *Brief* at 5. As plausible as the Government's explanation may be, the fact remains that the word "goods" is not included in the Procurement Regulation's definition of contract. Furthermore, the Government's explanation underscores the fact that the Procurement Regulations are ambiguous when applied to the facts of this case.

The Court adopts the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S.Ct 1081 (1992), cited by Plaintiff.

In McCarthy, a prisoner filed a civil action against the prison where he was incarcerated for its alleged denial of his medical care. The District Court dismissed the prisoner's complaint based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. McCarthy at 1085. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that:

Of "paramount importance" to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent. Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. But where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs.

McCarthy at 1086. (citations omitted)

Based on this reasoning expressed in McCarthy, the Court finds that its inquiry need go no further. The analysis of the Definitions section of the Procurement Regulations, supra, demonstrates that the Procurement Regulations are ambiguous as to whether the Dispute Requirements apply to contracts involving leases of real property.

The Government relies heavily on Section 5-201, Rivera et *al.* v. Guerrero et al., No. *93-015*, slip op. (N.M.I. December 22, *1993*) *and* Nansay Micronesia Corp. v. Govendo, 3 N.M.I. 12 (1992) for the proposition that it is mandatory to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit based on a contract involving the CNMI Government. This Court disagrees; neither Rivera nor Nansay involve disputes arising from executed and enforceable contracts. Instead, in

Rivera the Supreme Court held that a party bidding on a contract offered by the Commonwealth Ports Authority ("CPA") must, pursuant to the Commonwealth Ports Authority Procurement Rules and Regulations § 10.1(1)(a), 10 Com. Reg. 5642-43 (Aug. 15, 1988), file a timely protest with the CPA prior to filling a lawsuit. Likewise in Nansay, the Supreme Court held that a party who wishes to protest a building permit issued by the Coastal Resources Management ('CRM") must, pursuant to the Coastal Resources Management Act (2 CMC § 1541(b)), file a timely appeal with the CRM prior to filing a lawsuit.

As noted, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. But where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs." *McCarthy* at 1086. The Court finds that an ambiguity exists as to whether or not the Procurement Regulations provisions regarding disputes, as set forth in Procurement Regulation Section 5-201, as defined in Section 1-20, require exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to the subject Lease Agreement. Thus, the Procurement Regulations fail to "specifically mandate" or "clearly require exhaustion" of administrative remedies prior to filing an action in the Superior Court. Court. Consequently, this Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

The Court also notes that in future contracts the Government could easily avoid this issue by specifically incorporating the requirements of the Procurement Regulations into the terms of the contract. **See** for example, **United** States v. Holpuch, 328 U.S. 234, **66** S.Ct. 1000, 1001 (1946)(Both contracts in dispute specifically stated that 'All labor issues arising under this contract. . . shall be submitted to the Board of Labor Review;" Transcontinental & Western Air v. **Koppal**, 345 **U**.S. 653, 73 S.Ct. 906 (1953)(Under Missouri law, an employee must exhaust all administrative remedies specified in his contract, prior to filing a lawsuit).

### V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Government for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

So ORDERED this  $\underline{\mathbf{b}}$  day of October, 1997.

DAVID A. WISEMAN, Special Judge

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# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

JOAQUIN M. MANGLONA	)	Civil Action No. 97-486
Plaintiff,	)	
v.	)	ERRATA ORDER
GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS	) ) )	
Defendant.	) ) )	

The court's decision of September 30, 1997, entitled "Order Re Motion to Disqualify Special Judge David A. Wiseman", is hereby ordered to be published.

Special Judge

Swotice Demarkan