CETHER OCURT State COURT $\pm 1 \pm 0$ 1 2 941MAY 3 A7:46 3 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 4 FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 5 6 In the Matter of the Estate Civil Action No. 90-840) 7 of RITA KAIPAT, DECISION AND ORDER) 8 ON REMAND Deceased. 9 10 11 This matter came before the Court on remand from a Commonwealth Supreme Court Judgment issued on February 18, 1933. 12 13 Decedent Rita Kaipat died intestate in 1959, leaving property in Chalan Lau Lau, Saipan. Rita's direct descendants claim that she 14 held individual title to this land and that it now belongs solely 15 16 to them. The descendants of Rita's two brothers claim that she held the land as a land trustee under Carolinian custom and that 17 the 3 and belongs to members of all three branches of the family 1.8 19 The Supreme Court's Mandate asked this Court to reconsider two 20 issues in determining the proper owners of this property: 1) the circumstances of Rita's inheritance of the land; and 2) Rita's 21 conduct towards the family after she took control of the land. 22 23 24 I. FACTS 25 PROCEDURAL HISTORY Α. 26 Decedent Rita Kaipat was one of three children of Joaquin 27 Kaipat and Vicenta Mueilemar. Rita's brothers, Benigno and Isaac, FOR PUBLICATION 28

predeceased her; Benigno died before the Second World War, and 1 Isaac was killed during the invasion of Saipan in 1944. However, both brothers left surviving children and grandchildren, as did Rita. The family is Carolinian.

Trial in this matter was held from July 29 through August 6, 5 6 1991. The trial concerned two principal issues: 1) whether Rita had adopted certain persons by the Carolinian custom of mwei mwei; 7 8 and 2) whether Lot 1772 in Chalan Lau Lau belonged to Rita alone or to the family as a whole under the Carolinian custom of land 9 10 trusteeship by the eldest female. The Superior Court assued its 11 Decision on September 24, 1991, finding that Rita adopted three persons by mwei mwei but did not adopt four. others. Decision at 12 13 2-3. The Court also found that Rita held individual title to Lot 1772, giving res judicata effect to Land Commission Title 14 15 Determination 277, which Rita obtained in 1952. Id. at 3-4.

While the **Court's** findings on the adoption issue were not 16 17 disturbed on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this Court's 18 findings with respect to Lot 1772. In re Estate of Kaipat, 3 N.M.I. 494 (1993). According to the Supreme Court, the 1952 Title 19 Determination left unanswered: 20

21 the question of whether Rita inherited [Lot 17721 as her own or on behalf of the clan. [...] Because such "sole" inheritance appears to go against the grain of 22 Carolinian land law, it behooves the trial court to look 23 into the underlying basis for Rita's claim that she inherited the land outright. 24

Id. at 499. On remand, the parties stipulated to a resubmission 25 of the matter to the Court on briefs and evidentiary exhibits, but 26 without further hearing.

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1	B. ACQUISITION OF LOT 1772
2	The parties agree that Rita Kaipat "inherited" Lot 1772 from
3	her mother Vicenta Mueilemar; they disagree as to the nature of
4	that "inheritance." A document filed with the Land Titles
5	Investigating Commission in 1949 contains a declaration bearing
6	Rita's signature that she "inherited [the land] from my mother
7	Vicenta Muelemar, while I am the eldest of our family." Heirship
8	Claimants' Exhibit A. The Land Commission issued Title
9	Determination 277 on August 7, 1952, declaring Rita to be the
10	owner of Lot 1772. Administrator's Exhibit 1. According to the
11	testimony of Acting Senior Land Commissioner Juan Manglona, it was
12	not the Land Commission's practice to designate a landowner as
13	"Land Trustee" unless the land was held in the name of a deceased
14	person. Transcript of Proceedings, July 29, 1991 -August 6, 1991
15	("Transcript") at 41-43. This testimony is corroborated by a
16	Title Determination issued in 1958 to the "Heirs of Isaac Kaipat,
17	represented by Jose Kaipat as Land Trustee." Claimant's Exhibit
18	1.

19 Rita's direct heirs assert that Vicenta Mueilemar gave other 20 properties to her two sons, leaving the Chalan Lau Lau property to Rita alone. See Alejandro Laniyo's Proposed Findings of Fact and 21 22 Conclusions of Law, at 2-3. In support of this contention, they point to evidence that Rita's brother Isaac owned another property 23 in As Palomo -- referred to by some witnesses as Falapi -- and 24 25 claim that Isaac received this property from his parents. Id.; However, Isaac's daughter Joaquina 26 Transcript at 142-3, 322. Laniyo (who presumably had more direct knowledge of Isaac's land 27 holdings than Rita's children did) testified that this land was

not inherited from Isaac's parents. Id. at 385. The Land Commission documents relating to the As Palomo parcel tend to support Joaquina's testimony, stating variously that the land was "from German Gov't" and that Isaac "inherited" the As Palomo lot from "Luis Gapapi." Claimant No. 1's Exhibit 4.

Moreover, the record is completely devoid of evidence that 6 7 Rita's brother Benigno received any land from his parents. Rita's children suggest in their briefs that this could be true because 8 9 Beniqno was not truly the son of Vicenta Mueilemar and Joaquin 10 Kaipat Dolores Pelisamen's Proposed Findings of Fact, at 3 But the testimony on which they base this assertion -- the statement 11 12 on cross-examination of family friend Elena Teregeyo -- is 13 extremely vague and far removed from personal knowledge. 14 Transcript at **281-2.** Other witnesses with more direct knowledge 15 testified that Beniqno was the son of Joaquin and Vicenta.

Viewed in its totality, Court finds the evidence relating to Rita's acquisition of Lot 1772 to be highly inconclusive. This is not entirely surprising, since the event in question took place before the living memory of any witness and was unmarked by written documents. However, such evidence as exists points to the inference that Rita inherited the land pursuant to the Carolinian custom of land trusteeship.

C. USE OF LOT 1772

25 Rita's use of Lot 1772 since the Second World War is not the 26 subject of serious dispute. In its original Decision, this Court 27 found that:

28 From the evidence presented, it is clear that [Rita] opened her heart and home to her brothers Isaac and

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Benigno and their children. Rita allowed them to stay with her, permitted them to farm and build their houses on her property and share virtually everything else she owned.

Decision at 3. This finding was not disturbed on appeal, and the Court sees no reason to depart from it now.

The parties' dispute arises from the meaning to be ascribed to such conduct. In the **Court's** view, the evidence that Rita allowed her nieces and nephews to farm and build on Lot 1772 does not prove or disprove the parties¹ contentions regarding the character of Rita's ownership. She could easily have allowed the family this access to the land out of a sense of duty unconnected to land trusteeship <u>per se</u>. If this were the case, it-would be a cruel irony to use her acts of generosity towards her extended family as the basis for depriving her heirs their control over her inheritance. Thus, the Court will not ascribe any weight to this evidence.

Two principal pieces of evidence probative of the nature of Rita's land ownership were presented. First, Joaquina Laniyo presented testimony that Rita shared rental proceeds from the Chalan Lau Lau property with her brothers Isaac and Benigno. *Transcript* at 50, 76. Second, Rita's adopted daughter Auria Tagabuel asserted that Rita gave her documents relating to the ownership of Lot 1772 and to other properties Rita owned. Rita allegedly gave Auria instructions to give documents relating to two other properties to Rita's adopted sons Alejandro and Jesus. As for Lot 1772, Auria stated that Rita "told me to have them." *Transcript* at 206. However, on cross-examination, Auria testified that Rita wanted her to hold the land as trustee for the entire family and expected her "to follow Carolinian custom as to the

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land." Id. at 255. Auria qualified this admission by stating 1 2 "[i]f it's family land, the brothers already have their own land, 3 but the land in Chalan Lau Lau is just like for a gathering." Id. The Court considers this statement more probative of Auria's own 4 5 opinions regarding Carolinian custom than of Rita's expectations 6 on the issue. 7 8 II. ANALYSIS 9 THE SUPREME COURT'S MANDATE Δ. In *Estate* of *Kaipat*, *supra*, 3 *N.M. I*. at 499-500, the Supreme 10 11 Court stated: 12 Only by examining the basis for Rita's ownership in her name alone and determining whether it passes muster 13 factually in the light of Carolinian land law would there be a basis for a literal reading of the title 14 determination issued to Rita. If there is no basis for her to hold title in her name alone, then the land [...] If it is proven that. Rita 15 remains clan land. holds the land in trust, allowing the T.D. to stand because it is "final" would result in manifest injustice 16 to other heirs. 17 [...] The trial **court** should have **reviewed** an examined the basis for Rita's sole ownership against the 18 competing claim of the other heirs in view of the Carolinian customary land Paw. Only if it is established that Rita inherited the land alone, may the 19 title determination stand. 20 The parties dispute the meaning of these instructions on 21 remand. According to the heirs of Isaac and Benigno, the Supreme 22 Court's opinion establishes a presumption in favor of "clear 23 Carolinian land law" which must be rebutted by a party asserting 24 a deviation from customary practice. Brief of Heirship Claimants 25 at 11. Conversely, Rita's adopted child argues that the Supreme 26 Court wanted only a fuller statement from this Court providing 27 "assurance" that this Court's earlier finding of Rita's sole 28 ownership rested on the entire evidentiary record and not solely

on the face of Title Determination 277. Reply Brief of Alejandro
Laniyo at 2.

The Court rejects both of these interpretations. The Supreme 3 Court did not erect a "presumption" that a Title Determination by 4 5 the Land Commission is invalid if it runs counter to custom. Nor 6 did the Supreme Court reverse this Court's judgment merely for 7 want of "assurance" about the basis for the original ruling. 8 Rather, the Supreme Court deemed the Land Commission's finding 9 that Rita owned the land to be inadequate for an inquiry into the character of that ownership -- whether it was by fee simple or by 10 11 customary trusteeship. In the Court's view, the Supreme Court's decision stands for the following proposition: when a Title 12 13 Determination vests title in an individual, but fails to specify 14 the <u>nature</u> of the individual's ownership, the court must consider any evidence that the individual owned other than a fee simple 15 interest pursuant to local custom. 16

17 Having conducted that inquiry here, this Court cannot say 18 that "there is no basis for Rita to hold title in her name alone." 19 However, neither can the Court say that "it is proven that Rita 20 holds the land in trust." The events in question are too remote, 21 and the available evidence too scanty, for such clear-cut findings. However, the preponderance of the evidence weighs in 22 23 favor of Rita's customary trusteeship. In particular, the Court takes note of the following evidence: 24

that Rita mentioned being "the eldest of our family" in her declaration before the Land Commission;

- 27 that Rita shared rental proceeds from the property with her brothers;
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1 that there is no evidence of Rita's brother Benigno receiving other property from his parents; 2 that the available evidence suggests that Rita's brother Isaac received the As Palomo property from 3 a source other than his parents; 4 that Rita's adopted daughter Auria admitted that Rita gave her title to Lot 1772 pursuant to 5 Carolinian custom. 6 In view of this evidence, and pursuant to the Supreme Court's 7 mandate, the Court now finds that Rita owned Lot 1772 as a land 8 trustee for the family, including the descendants of her two 9 brothers. 10 11 R APPLICABLE CAROLINIAN CUSTOM 12 Title 8 CMC § 2904 governs Carolinian customary law regarding 13 descent and distribution of land. Estate of Kaipat, supra, 3 14 N.M.I. at 498 n. 2; see also Willbanks v. Stein, Civil Action No. 15 93-337 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. July 19, 1993) (although Probate Code 16 does not apply of its own force to estates prior to 1984, Court 17 Looks to Probate Code as **codification** of pre-existing custom). As 18 to family land, § 2904(b) specifies that members of the family 19 have the same use rights to the land as the customary trustee's 20 rights. Claimant Alejandro Laniyo argues that such "use rights" 21 do not affect the trustee's power of alienation over the land. 22 Laniyo Brief at 7-9. However, § 2904(c) requires the entire 23 family to consent to any transfer or disposition of the land by 24 the customary trustee. $\frac{1}{2}$ 25 26 27

^{28 &}lt;sup>1</sup>/ The procedures for obtaining such consent are set forth in S 2909, which provides for majority vote among the children of each deceased sibling of the original customary trustee.

1	Here, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that Rita
2	designated Auria Tagabuel as customary land trustee. Whatever
3	Auria's personal understanding of Carolinian custom may be, the
4	Court is constrained to apply those customs codified in 8 CMC §
5	2904 et seq. Accordingly, the Court finds that the heirs of
6	Benigno and Isaac have equal use-rights to Lot 1772 as the heirs
7	of Rita, and that all three branches of the family must consent to
8	any alienation of the land, pursuant to 8 CMC § 2909.
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10	IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>
11	For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS:
12	1. Title to Lot 1772 in Chalan Lau Lau is hereby declared
13	to be family land, owned by the heirs of Vicenta Mueilemar
14	represented by Auria Tagabuel as customary trustee.
15	2. Within thirty days of the issuance of this Decision and
16	Order, the parties shall submit a stipulated Order setting forth
17	the final list of the heirs entitled to share Lot 1772. The Order
18	shall constitute the Decree of Final Distribution of the Estate of
19	Rita Kaipat. If the parties cannot agree, the matter may be
20	resubmitted to the Court by motion within thirty days.
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22	So ORDERED this day of May, 1994.
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24	ALEXADRO C. CASTRO, Fresiding Judge
25	AllEANDROC. CASIRO FIESIUING Judge
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