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BY BIXC

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13-0112

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

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V.

ANTONIO SUING QUIZON,

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER came before the Court for a bench trial on June 11 and 16, 2014 in Courtroom 202A. Assistant Attorney General Heather P. Barcinas the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("the Commonwealth") was represented by Antonio Quizon ("Defendant") was present and represented by attorney Joaquin DLG. Torres.

Based on the filings, oral arguments and applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for a mistrial.

II. BACKGROUND

In this action Defendant faced one count of Assault and Battery in violation of 6 CMC § 1202(a), and one count of Disturbing the Peace in violation of 6 CMC § 3101(b). On June 11, 2014, the bench trial in this matter began. However, during the cross-examination of the alleged victim, Joy Bayatan, Ms. Bayatan testified about evidence that the Commonwealth failed to provide to the Defendant during discovery. Ms. Bayatan



testified that she took photographs of her injuries with her cell phone following the alleged assault by Defendant. Additionally, Ms. Bayatan testified that she went to the Commonwealth Health Center (CHC) days after the alleged assault and underwent an ultrasound. The results of the ultrasound were then sent to Guam for examination. The Commonwealth had access to this evidence and did not produce it to Defendant during discovery. Defendant moved for a continuance of the trial to review this new evidence, and the Court granted the continuance, order the Commonwealth to produce the photographs and medical records, and continued the trial to June 16, 2014.

The bench trial resumed on June 16, 2014. After the Commonwealth rested its case, the Defendant took the stand. During his direct examination, the Defendant testified that he had given a written statement to the Department of Public Safety ("DPS") while in custody at the Department of Corrections ("D.O.C."), outside the presence of counsel. However, this statement was not produced during discovery, and had never been reviewed by defense counsel. The Court ordered the Commonwealth to produce Defendant's statement. Defendant then moved the Court for a mistrial, arguing that the Commonwealth violated Rule 16 of the Commonwealth Rules of Criminal Procedure, and violated Defendant's due process rights by failing to turn over *Brady* materials.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant's motion for a mistrial raises two issues that will be discussed separately below. First, whether Defendant's due process rights have been violated due to the Commonwealth's failure to turnover *Brady* material on two separate occasions. Second, whether the Commonwealth's failure to turnover the *Brady* material constitutes a violation of Rule 16, and if so the proper remedy to resolve the situation.

1. Brady Due Process Violation

The United States Supreme Court held in *Brady* that the "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad

faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87; *CNMI v. Campbell*, 4 NMI 11, 15 (1993)(quoting *Brady*); *cf. United States v. Agurs*, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976)(noting a defendant does not have to request evidence). The fundamental policy behind requiring the disclosure of *Brady* materials is to ensure that the defendant is afforded a fair trial. *CNMI v. Campbell*, 4 N.M.I. at 15.

A defendant must show that the government failed to disclose material evidence for a *Brady* violation to occur. *Id.* Such material includes information that "bears on the credibility of a significant witness" as well as favorable impeachment evidence. *Id.* The prosecution does not have a duty to turnover *Brady* materials prior to trial; however, the government must produce exculpatory material in time for the defendant's effective use of those materials at trial. *Id.*at 16; *U.S. v. Gordon*, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1988). Effective use of evidentiary materials has been found to exist when the evidence was still "of value to the accused." *CNMI v. Hong*, 2013 MP 19 ¶ 15 (quoting *United States v. Davenport*, 753 F.2d 1460, 1462 (9th Cir. 1985)).

When a court is presented with a potential *Brady* violation, "the court has broad discretion to remedy the problem before the accused is prejudiced by non-disclosure." *Campbell*, 4 N.M.I. at 16. In addition, "an accused does not suffer a due process violation until he or she has been tried and convicted." *CNMI v. Adlaon*, 4 N.M.I. 171, 174 (1994) (citing *Campbell*, 4 N.M.I at 16).

As was stated above, there have been two instances in which it was discovered that the Commonwealth failed to disclose potential *Brady* information and thus both instances will be discussed separately below.

A. Cellular Photographs and Medical Records

The first potential *Brady* violation that has arisen during the bench trial occurred when the Commonwealth failed to turn over the cellular telephone photographs taken by Ms. Bayatan as well as her medical records. The materiality of these pieces of evidence to Defendant seems clear. Documentation of the alleged victim's injuries would be highly probative to the elements of the Assault and Battery Charge as well as possible

impeachment evidence. Although both the photographs and medical records would be considered *Brady* material, these materials were disclosed by the government to Defendant prior to the end of trial. To further protect Defendant's constitutional rights, the Court granted a continuance to allow Defendant to properly assess and adapt his trial strategy in regards to the newly disclosed material.

When the bench trial recommenced, Defendant had the opportunity to use both items during cross-examination of Ms. Bayatan and chose not to. Furthermore, both pieces of evidence are still available for Defendant's use during his case-in-chief. For these reasons, Defendant is still able to make "effective use" of both the photographs and medical records and thus there has been no *Brady* violation in regards to the photographs and medical records.

B. Defendant's Written Statement to DPS

The second incident in which an issue arose with the Commonwealth's failure to properly turnover information to Defendant occurred when the defendant waived his right to remain silent and took the stand. During Defendant's testimony it was revealed that while in custody at the D.O.C. he gave a written statement to DPS that was never disclosed during discovery. Although the prosecutor is correct in asserting that Defendant's written statement may be inculpatory in some regards, the statement may also be exculpatory due to the fact that in the statement Defendant asserts that it was Ms. Banatay that first escalated the confrontation by yelling. Such information would be highly valuable to the Disturbing the Peace charge and possibly also valuable for the Assault and Battery charge as well. Furthermore, disclosure of the statement would also be favorable to Defendant in regards to possible punishment that he may face. If the statement was disclosed beforehand, Defendant may have been more willing to enter into a plea agreement and thus such disclosure would qualify as *Brady* material.

Additionally, the Commonwealth did provide Defendant the statement pursuant to Court order. However, the complication presents itself that the Defendant has already waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent as soon as he took the stand.

Defendant's "effective use" of the statement is questionable at this point because notice of this statement prior to trial would have probably been the most useful for possibly entering into a plea agreement or in preparing a defense for trial. In this situation it appears that the Court attempted to remedy the *Brady* violation in granting a continuance, but the damage at this point is now irreparable. Thus, it would appear unlikely at this juncture in the bench trial that any action short of a mistrial would remedy the prejudice caused to Defendant by the nondisclosure.

Although it would appear that nondisclosure of Defendant's statement to DPS is a potential *Brady* violation, Supreme Court precedent is clear in that no violation of Defendant's due process rights has occurred because no verdict has been rendered and Defendant has not been convicted.¹ Thus, there is no due process violation and those grounds for a mistrial are improper.

2. Rule 16 Violation

Commonwealth Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A) provides that the government, if so requested, must disclose to the defendant "any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government". NMI R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A).² Failure to comply with a discovery request allows a court to grant a continuance, prohibit a party from introducing evidence, or a court "may enter such other as it deems just under the circumstances." *See id.*(d)(2). Dismissal is an "extraordinary remedy" and as such is a disfavored remedy. *Campbell*, 4 NMI at 16. To warrant a

It is puzzling why the Court must wait for a verdict for a Due Process violation to occur. However, Rule 16 allows the Court to remedy the potential Due Process violation, thus protecting Defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial.

² Because the Commonwealth Rules of Criminal Procedure are modeled after the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, federal cases interpreting the counterpart Federal Rules are helpful in interpreting the Commonwealth Rules of Criminal Procedure. *Commonwealth v. Ramangmau*, 4 N.M.I. 227, 233 (1995). However, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 was amended in 2002; therefore, the formatting and wording of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 is no longer identical to NMI R. Crim. P. 16.

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dismissal the government's misconduct must be flagrant and must have prejudiced the defendant. *Id.*

As was discussed above, any potential *Brady* violation in regards to the cellular photographs and medical records of Ms. Bayatan has been remedied by the continuance granted by the Court. The continuance gave Defendant an opportunity to properly adapt any trial strategy and thus Defendant was not prejudiced by nondisclosure and there was no Rule 16 violation.

However, the nondisclosure of Defendant's statement to DPS falls squarely within Rule 16 because, as was discussed above, Defendant's statement is relevant to a possible plea agreement before trial or to Defendant's trial strategy. Furthermore, Defendant's statement was in the custody and control of DPS and as such the prosecutor was fully able to have access to such information through proper diligence. The Court sought to remedy the situation by granting a continuance; however, the damage is now irreparable and going forward with the trial would be severely prejudicial. Defendant will be prejudiced because in waiving his right to remain silent and taking the stand he is still subject to cross examination and questioning of any inconsistencies between his written statement and trial testimony. The Court does not agree with the Commonwealth's assertion that there are no inconsistencies between Defendant's statement to DPS and testimony given at trial. There are inconsistencies between the written statement and Defendant's testimony surrounding circumstances between the alleged altercation between Defendant and Ms. Bayatan. Going forward Defendant will be prejudiced because he may have chosen not to take the stand having been aware of the statement. Striking his testimony will not completely remedy this situation and is thus not a viable option. The only appropriate remedy now would be to grant Defendant's motion for mistrial.

This Court understands that a mistrial is generally disfavored, but at this juncture it is apparent that the Commonwealth's behavior has risen to the level of flagrant misconduct and thus a mistrial is warranted. *Commonwealth v. Adlaon*, 4 N.M.I. 171, 175 (1994)(discussing that dismissal is appropriate when the defendant has been prejudiced by

the government's flagrant misconduct). The Court has been forced already to attempt to remedy a nondisclosure issue in the beginning of the trial in regards to the cellular photographs and medical records. It is now forced to remedy yet another potential *Brady* issue. Additionally, this court is extremely concerned with the fact that Defendant was questioned during detainment while Defendant was represented by counsel. Although the questioning ceased once DPS learned that Defendant was represented by counsel, this is still a grave error that should be cautioned against in the future. These mistakes are extremely flagrant and cannot be properly remedied due to the fact that Defendant has already waived his right to remain silent. *See id.* In hopes to properly protect Defendant's fundamental rights to a fair trial Defendant's motion for a mistrial must be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Commonwealth's multiple discovery violations, the most serious of which came to light only after the Defendant had waived his Fifth Amendment right and taken the stand, cannot be remedied without a mistrial. The Court finds that proceeding with the trial would infringe upon Defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Due Process clause of the United States Constitution. Thus, Defendant's motion for a mistrial is GRANTED.

ARAJA, Presiding Judge

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of September, 2014.

³ DPS's conduct in questioning Defendant whilst he was represented by counsel is an egregious error compounded by the fact that DPS failed to come forward with this mistakenly acquired statement. The Court is very concerned that these types of practices are occurring and would strongly warn against such future practices.