For Publication

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,) CRIMINAL CASE NO. 06-0160C) DPS NO: 06-03948
Plaintiff,)
vs. LEONA CHARLEY ENRIQUEZ, (d.o.b. 11/02/1976)) MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
(d.0.b. 11/02/1970))
Defendant.	

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 17, 2006, the Commonwealth filed an Information charging the Defendant, Leona C. Enriquez, with two counts of misdemeanor criminal mischief for an incident that occurred on April 25, 2006. The Commonwealth subsequently amended the Information to elevate the first count to a felony offense based on the value of the property damages incurred.

After several jury trial settings, the case ultimately went forward with a jury trial on the first count and a bench trial on the second count on July 16, 2007. In the interim, the Fifteenth Northern Marianas Commonwealth Legislature passed Public Law 15-46, the "Probation Reform Act of 2006," which became law on January 29, 2007.

On July 19, 2007, the jury adjudged Defendant Leona C. Enriquez NOT GUILTY of the felony offense of Criminal Mischief as charged in Count I of the First Amended Information, and Defendant was discharged as to this count. For the misdemeanor offense of Criminal Mischief, in violation of 6 CMC § 1803(a)(1), as charged in Count II of the First Amended Information, this Court found that the Commonwealth met its burden of proof and adjudged the Defendant GUILTY of the crime charged. The

Court set the case for a sentencing hearing on September 12, 2007, and ordered the Office of Adult Probation to prepare a pre-sentence investigation report.

The sentencing hearing was continued to September 26th, at which time the Defendant objected to the Probation Officer's recommendation to impose a period of three years of probation pursuant to Section 5(b)(1) of Public Law 15-46. The Commonwealth disagreed, and the Court set a briefing schedule and heard arguments on this issue on November 21, 2007.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing and sentencing on November 21, 2007. The Commonwealth was represented by Chief Prosecutor Jefferey L. Warfield, Sr. Defendant Leona C. Enriquez appeared with court-appointed counsel, Edward C. Arriola, Esq.

ANALYSIS

The crime of misdemeanor criminal mischief carries a penalty of not more than one year imprisonment, and not more than a \$1,000 fine. 6 CMC §§ 1803(b), 1601(b)(3), 4101(c). After preparing a thorough pre-sentence investigation report, the Probation Officer recommended a sentence of one year imprisonment with a minimum of 30 days to serve, *plus three years of probation to perform certain conditions* pursuant to Public Law 15-46. The Defendant, through counsel, vehemently objected to the three years of probation under the new Public Law 15-46 based on the claim that this would violate Defendant's rights to be free from *ex post facto* punishment.

Defendant argues that an extension of probation from one year to three years would violate the *ex post facto* provision of article 1, section 1 of the NMI Constitution, which provides that "[n]o law shall be made that is ... an ex post facto law...." and article 1, section 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution, which provides that "[n]o Bill of Attanider or ex post facto Law shall be passed." *Def's Ex Post Facto Mem.* at 2. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, relies on two recently decided unpublished decisions of the Superior Court, *CNMI v. Mangarero*, Cr. Case No. 05-0103, and *CNMI v.*

Ray, Cr. Case No. 05-0329C, which interpreted the Probation Reform Act, to argue that Public Law 15-46 does not "increase the quantum of punishment."

Article 1, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from passing any *ex post facto* law. The parties are in agreement that the U.S. Supreme Court decision of *Calder v. Bull*, 3 U.S. 386, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) governs the law on *ex post facto* law. The Supreme Court in *Calder* defines an *ex post facto* law as:

- (1) Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action;
- (2) every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed;
- (3) every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
- (4) every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.

by the U.S. Supreme Court, the ex post facto clause is aimed at laws that retroactively alter the definition

of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514

The Defendant relies on the third example in the Calder ex post facto analysis. As later explained

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. at 390 (Chase, J.) (emphasis added).

U.S. 499, 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995).

The law in the Commonwealth at the time the Defendant committed the offense limited a criminal sentence to not greater than "the combined length of any prison term plus any suspended portion (and resulting probation) which is to follow the prison term." *Commonwealth v. Oden*, 3 NMI 186, 198 (1992). In *Oden*, the trial court sentenced the defendant to five years probation *after* the defendant served his three-year jail term for a crime punishable by not more than five years imprisonment. *Id.* at 197. Our Supreme Court concluded that such a construction of the trial court's sentence renders the sentence excessive and illegal. *Id.*, 197-198; *Commonwealth v. Yao*, 2007 MP 12, ¶ 19 (one year of probation erroneously exceeded maximum statutory sentence of six months for offense). In this case,

this Court concludes that imposing the three-year term of probation for the misdemeanor offense punishable by only one year of imprisonment would be contrary to the law that existed at the time of the offense, as interpreted in *Oden* and *Yao*.

Laws affecting the *procedures* related to parole and probation may be held to violate the prohibition on ex post facto punishment if they "alter standards" for parole or probation or "create a significant risk of increasing the measure of punishment for the covered offense." Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 1367, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000), quoting, *Morales*, supra, 514 U.S. at 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597. See Combs v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 917 P.2d 74 (Or. App. 1996) (imposition of longer parole term rather than the shorter term applicable at the time crime was committed was error). Public Law 15-46 plainly does more than this; it provides for an additional three-year period of probation following the defendant's period of incarceration for the offense that was not part of the maximum possible sentence that could have been imposed at the time the offense was committed. Applying Public Law 15-46 in this case would therefore violate the Defendant's rights against ex post facto laws. Accordingly, this Court will not apply Section 5 of Public Law 15-46 (enacting 6 CMC § 4105(b)(2)) against the Defendant, but will impose a sentence consistent with the laws of the Commonwealth at the time the offense was committed on April 25, 2006.

SO ORDERED this 29th day of November, 2007.

RAMONA V. MANGLOÑA, Associate Judge

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