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4	FOR PUBLICATION	
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6	IN THE SU	PERIOR COURT
7	OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS	
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9	JOSE CH. CAMACHO,) Civil Action No. 04-0220E
10	Plaintiff,))
11	VS.) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
12	CNMI DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC	DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
13	WORKS and the MARIANAS PUBLIC LANDS AUTHORITY,	AND DENYING MPLA'S CROSS- MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
14		,
	Defendants	
15	Defendants.))) -)
15 16	Defendants.	
15		June 30, 2005, at 1:30 p.m. in courtroom 223A on
15 16 17 18	THIS MATTER came on for hearing	June 30, 2005, at 1:30 p.m. in courtroom 223A on
15 16 17	THIS MATTER came on for hearing Plaintiff, Jose Ch. Camacho's ("Plaintiff") Mot	ion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Marianas
15 16 17 18 19	THIS MATTER came on for hearing Plaintiff, Jose Ch. Camacho's ("Plaintiff") Mot	•
15 16 17 18 19 20	THIS MATTER came on for hearing Plaintiff, Jose Ch. Camacho's ("Plaintiff") Mot Public Lands Authority's ("MPLA") Cross-Mo	ion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Marianas
115 116 117 118 119 220 221	THIS MATTER came on for hearing Plaintiff, Jose Ch. Camacho's ("Plaintiff") Mot Public Lands Authority's ("MPLA") Cross-Mo	ion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Marianas otion for Summary Judgment. Robert Tenorio Torres eared for MPLA, and Alan Barak appeared on behalf
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	THIS MATTER came on for hearing Plaintiff, Jose Ch. Camacho's ("Plaintiff") Mot Public Lands Authority's ("MPLA") Cross-Mo appeared for Plaintiff, Ramon Quichocho appe of the CNMI Department of Public Works ("D	ion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Marianas otion for Summary Judgment. Robert Tenorio Torres eared for MPLA, and Alan Barak appeared on behalf
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	THIS MATTER came on for hearing Plaintiff, Jose Ch. Camacho's ("Plaintiff") Mot Public Lands Authority's ("MPLA") Cross-Mo appeared for Plaintiff, Ramon Quichocho appe of the CNMI Department of Public Works ("D	ion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Marianas otion for Summary Judgment. Robert Tenorio Torres eared for MPLA, and Alan Barak appeared on behalf DPW").
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	THIS MATTER came on for hearing Plaintiff, Jose Ch. Camacho's ("Plaintiff") Mot Public Lands Authority's ("MPLA") Cross-Mo appeared for Plaintiff, Ramon Quichocho appe of the CNMI Department of Public Works ("D I. BAC This matter originally came before	ion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Marianas otion for Summary Judgment. Robert Tenorio Torres cared for MPLA, and Alan Barak appeared on behalf DPW"). EKGROUND the Court pursuant to Plaintiff's May 17, 2004,
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	THIS MATTER came on for hearing Plaintiff, Jose Ch. Camacho's ("Plaintiff") Mot Public Lands Authority's ("MPLA") Cross-Mo appeared for Plaintiff, Ramon Quichocho appe of the CNMI Department of Public Works ("D I. BAC This matter originally came before	ion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Marianas otion for Summary Judgment. Robert Tenorio Torres eared for MPLA, and Alan Barak appeared on behalf DPW").
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	THIS MATTER came on for hearing Plaintiff, Jose Ch. Camacho's ("Plaintiff") Mot Public Lands Authority's ("MPLA") Cross-Mo appeared for Plaintiff, Ramon Quichocho appe of the CNMI Department of Public Works ("D I. BAC This matter originally came before Complaint, alleging a taking without compensa	ion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Marianas otion for Summary Judgment. Robert Tenorio Torres cared for MPLA, and Alan Barak appeared on behalf DPW"). EKGROUND the Court pursuant to Plaintiff's May 17, 2004,

to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions, asserting that MPLA is not a proper party to the suit and that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court denied MPLA's motions on January 13, 2005, holding that MPLA is the proper party to the suit because its predecessor, MPLC entered into an agreement with Plaintiff to compensate Plaintiff for his land, and, given the circumstances of the case, the exhaustion rule did not apply.¹

Following the January 13, 2005, ruling, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which was met with a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeks a summary judgment ruling on the taking of Plaintiff's land for a public purpose and asserts that:

- 1) Because Plaintiff's land was taken for a public purpose, he is entitled to "just compensation" in the amount offered Plaintiff in 1991 and 1992;
- 2) "Just compensation" requires something more than the fair market value at the time of the taking due to the long delay in compensating Plaintiff for land taken in the early 1990's; and,
- 3) Plaintiff is entitled to breach of contract damages pursuant to the failure to pay Plaintiff in accordance with a 1992 compensation agreement.

MPLA's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment raised the very same issues the Court dismissed on January 13, 2005, namely, that MPLA is an improper party to the suit and that "Plaintiff's choice is clear - exhaust AVAILABLE administrative remedies at MPLA." See, MPLA's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for (Partial) Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in MPLA's Favor, filed June 7, 2005; and Reply to Opposition to Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in MPLA's Favor, MPLA's Opposition to Plaintiff's

¹ For a detailed discussion, see *Order Denying MPLA's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions*, January 13, 2005.

Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 56(g), filed June 29, 2005. MPLA's Cross-Motion was accompanied by a Declaration from Ramon Salas ("Salas Declaration") stating that Plaintiff was never offered compensation of \$150 per square meter. Plaintiff then moved for sanctions against MPLA for having submitted the "irrelevant" Salas Declaration in an attempt to "fabricate a dispute concerning the value of [Plaintiff's] property." See Plaintiff's Reply to MPLA's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Opposition to MPLA's Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment, and Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 56(g), filed June 16, 2005.

II. DISCUSSION

A court may grant summary judgment when there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Com. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Santos v. Santos, 4 N.M.I. 206, 209 (1994). The moving party bears the initial burden to show the court that there is an absence of a genuine issue concerning any material fact and that the non-moving party cannot prevail. Id. at 210. In order to survive the motion, the non-moving party must then show that there is evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. Cabrera v. Heirs of De Castro, 1 N.M.I. 172, 176 (1990). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 176-77. The court must accept all of the non-moving party's evidence as true and will view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 176. However, as noted above, MPLA's response to Plaintiff's motion was to renew the issues already ruled upon by this Court in January 2005. As such, the Court need only determine whether there is an absence of genuine issue of material fact.

Turning first to "just compensation" for Plaintiff's land which is now being used for a public purpose, and has been since the early 1990's: the United States Constitution provides that where the government requires a land owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of his property,

however minor, the government must provide just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. 5. Normally, the proper measure of just compensation for the government's permanent taking of private property is "the fair market value of [the] property at the time of the taking." *See, e.g., Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States*, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74, 93 S. Ct. 791, 795, 36 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1973). In the present matter, the government determined in 1992 that just compensation for the three lots comprising the 737 square meters of Plaintiff's land was \$90.00 per square meter for a fee simple interest and an additional \$299,000 severance damage. Plaintiff has never disputed that valuation and, in fact, assented to the valuation in writing on at least two occasions. MPLA does not provide any convincing argument that the 1992 valuation was in error nor does it present any reason, much less a compelling reason, why a valuation other than the 1992 valuation is appropriate. As such, the Court determines that the \$90.00 per square meter for a fee simple interest and an additional \$299,000 severance damage amount offered to and accepted by Plaintiff is the proper measure of the value of the three lots comprising the 737 square meters of Plaintiff's land taken for public use.

Turning next to whether "just compensation" includes interest and breach of contract damages in light of the years that have passed since the taking of Plaintiff's land: the United States Supreme Court has held that "the Fifth Amendment does not forbid government to take land and pay for it later." *Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States*, 467 U.S. 1, 7, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2194, 81 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984). In so ruling, the *Kirby* court did not place any limits on the amount of time in which the government could delay remitting payment before being in breach of contract. However, while *Kirby* did not place limits on the time for compensation, it did recognize that if disbursement is delayed, "the owner is entitled to interest thereon sufficient to ensure that he is placed in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if the payment had coincided with the appropriation." *Id.*, 467 U.S. at 10-11, 104 S. Ct. at 2194 (citing Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S.

341, 344, 47 S. Ct. 611, 612, 71 L. Ed. 1083 (1927); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306, 43 S. Ct. 354, 356, 67 L. Ed. 664 (1923)).

Applying *Kirby* to the present matter, because the government may employ a "take land now and pay later" approach, Plaintiff is not entitled to breach of contract damages. However, he is entitled to interest in an amount that will place him in as good a position as if he had been compensated at the time of the taking. Making a value judgment as to the amount of compensation that is just, fair, equitable, or reasonable in respect to interest due Plaintiff is a fact determination, which means, issues of material fact remain regarding what constitutes "just compensation." *See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. United States*, 374 F.2d 516 (Cl. Ct. 1967); *Seminole Indians of Fla. v. United States*, 455 F.2d 539, 543 (Cl. Ct. 1972).

Turning to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions: Plaintiff argues that sanctions are appropriate on the grounds that MPLA filed the Salas Declaration in bad faith and solely for the purpose of delay. However, while the Court disagrees with MPLA and the importance MPLA assigns the Salas Declaration, a losing argument does not justify sanctions. Furthermore, a court must exercise caution in invoking its inherent power to regulate practice before it, and the court's power to sanction conduct should be employed only when the conduct is egregious and clearly done in bad faith. The court makes no such finding in the submission of the Salas Declaration.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment setting the fair market value of the three lots comprising 737 square meters of Plaintiff's land at \$90.00 per square meter for a fee simple interest and an additional \$299,000 severance damages is GRANTED and MPLA is hereby ordered to remit payment to Plaintiff;

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Breach of Contract damages is hereby denied and dismissed; and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding "just compensation" is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on monies owed him by MPLA, however, the amount due is a question of fact to be determined at trial. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions is DENIED. Defendant MPLA's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. A Status Conference is to be held on August 18, 2005 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 223A. So ORDERED this 5th day of August 2005. David A. Wiseman, Associate Judge