FOR PUBLICATION	
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	PERIOR COURT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE	E NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
AUNTIE MAG'S FOOD AND CATERING SERVICES, INC.,	) CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-0472A
Plaintiff,	)
	) ORDER FOLLOWING ORAL RULING DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
	) TO DISMISS FOR LACK ) OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
v. CNMI PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM	)
and RITA HOCOG INOS, Commissioner,	
Defendants.	
	RODUCTION
	on September 12, 2002, in Courtroom 205A at 10:00
,	gment pursuant to 1 CMC §§ 3202, 9112, 7 CMC §§
	endants' Motion to Dismiss. James S. Sirok, Esq.,
	Catering Services, Inc. ("Plaintiff"). Timothy M. Conner,
	blic School System ("PSS") and Rita Hocog Inos.
·	Defendants"). The Court, having reviewed the documents
	, and being fully advised, renders its written decision
following its oral ruling denying Defendant's Mo	otion to Dismiss.
	sition to Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief. The Court on s motion before proceeding to Plaintiff's motion for declaratory

## II. BACKGROUND

Each year PSS awards various food service management companies with contracts to provide meals to various schools. *See* Pl.'s Req. for Declaratory J. ("Pl.'s Req.") at 3. These awards are given after consideration of various proposals from several food service management companies pursuant to a Request for Proposal ("RFP"). *Id.* at 3. The CNMI PSS Procurement Rules and Regulations ("PSSPRR") provide the rules and policies governing PSS's conduct in requesting proposals, evaluating proposals, and awarding contracts. *See* Pl.'s Req., Addendum A ("Add. A").

In April and May of 2002, PSS solicited competitive sealed proposals from qualified food service management companies to provide school breakfast and lunch on Saipan, Tinian and Rota for school year 2002-2003 under RFP02-004. *See* Pl.'s Req. at 4; Compl., Ex. A, B. On July 11, 2002, Plaintiff, a food service management company, submitted its proposal. *See* Pl.'s Req., Ex. C. On July 31, 2002, Greg Sablan as the Acting Food and Nutrition Services Administrator for PSS, thru Louise Conception as the Acting Deputy Commissioner for Administration, issued a written Memorandum<sup>2</sup> to the

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<sup>2</sup> The July 31, 2002, letter provided, in pertinent part:

To : Commissioner of Education

Thru : Acting Deputy Commissioner For Administration From : Acting Food & Nutrition Services Administrator

Subject: : RFP02-004-Bid Evaluation For Proposals For Saipan Schools

On June 11, 2002, at 2:00 p.m. RFP02-004, which is for the provision of school breakfast and lunch for schools on Saipan, Tinian Elem. and Rota, was opened. . . . There were a total of seven proposals that submitted a proposal for the schools on Saipan and they were the following:

- 1. M V Reyes Catering
- 2. Kalayaan, Inc.
- 3. LSG Lufsthansa Catering
- 4. Auntie Mag's Catering
- 5. Barney's Pizza and Pasta House
- 6. Triple M Corporation
- Three Roses.

. .

Based on the evaluation, listed below were the results of the evaluation:

No. Proposer Technical Bid Price Financial Total:

In view of the above results, it is hereby recommended that the following proposer be awarded for the following schools:

- 1. Proposer: M.V. Reyes Catering . . . .
  - 2. Proposer Kalayaan, Inc. . . .
  - 3. Proposer LSG Lufsthansa Catering . . . .
  - 4. Proposer Auntie Mag's Catering . . . .
  - 5. Barney's Pizza . . . .

Should you be in agreement with the above recommendation, please concur below and

Commissioner of Education

five proposers was also informed that PSS was "currently processing a contract" for Plaintiff to provide meals to the schools identified in the letter. *Id.* On August 9, 2002, Plaintiff executed a written protest to the awarding of contracts pursuant to PSSPRR 5-101(1)(a). Pl.'s Req., Ex. G.

On August 12, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Superior Court against Defendants for both injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief enjoining Defendants from awarding the contracts as set forth in its RFP02-004 and requiring Defendants to re-evaluate the bids received under RFP02-004 and award the services to bidders in accordance with CNMI laws. In addition, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, declaring the current manner used by PSS to evaluate bids received under RFP02-004 as unfair, unequal in treatment, arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory and not in compliance with CNMI laws.

On August 14, 2002, Defendants were served with the Summons and Complaint through Timothy M. Conner, Esq., Defendants' legal counsel. On August 21, 2002, Plaintiff requested for a hearing only on its claim for declaratory relief. On September 9, 2002, Defendants filed their Opposition and moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On September 10, 2002, Plaintiff filed its Reply. On September 12, 2002, the Court heard oral arguments on the jurisdictional issue and took the matter under advisement. On September 17, 2002, the Court met *in camera* with both parties. Following the meeting, on September 23, 2002, the Court issued a short order affirming the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and had the matter calendared for evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief on September 24, 2002. On September 24, 2002, the parties stipulation to take the matter off calendar.

## III. QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the July 31, 2002 letter, recommending the awarding of contracts and the approval of the recommendation by PSS officials, and the August 1, 2002 letter, informing Plaintiff of the award, constitute final agency action subject to review by the Superior Court pursuant to 1 CMC § 9112(d).

### IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants assert that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's request because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. *See* Defs.' Opp'n to Mot. for Declaratory J. ("Defs.' Opp'n") at 6, 8. Defendants argue that the July 31, 2002, and August 1, 2002, letters to Plaintiff

do not constitute final agency action because Plaintiff subsequently filed a protest with PSS, that the process of the protest remains ongoing, and the Commissioner has not rendered a decision.<sup>4</sup> Defs.' Opp'n at 3, 5. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to of the Commonwealth Administrative Procedures Act, 1 CMC § 9101 *et seq.*, ("APA"). Plaintiff argues that the APA and the PSSPRR do not mandate that Plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies and that the correspondences at issue do constitute PSS's final agency action. *See* Pl.'s Req., Ex. E; Compl., Ex. C. Both parties rely on *Rivera v. Guerrero*, 4 N.M.I. 79 (1993), to support their respective positions.

The jurisdictional questions posed turn on whether Commonwealth laws or regulations preclude judicial review of PSS' action and, if they do not, whether the correspondences constitute final agency action appropriate for judicial review under the APA. At issue is the effect of 1 CMC § 9112 (b) and (d). The APA at 1 CMC § 9112 bears the caption "Administrative Procedure: Judicial Review of Contested Cases." Subsection (b) reads: "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action, is entitled to judicial review of the action within 30 days thereafter in the Commonwealth Superior Court." *See* 1 CMC § 9112(b).

# Subsection (d) reads:

Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. . . . Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.

See 1 CMC § 9112(d).

In *Rivera*, the N.M.I. Supreme Court dealt with an appeal of the trial court's decision to dismiss a complaint filed under 1 CMC § 9112 for plaintiffs' failure to file within the time limitations established by law. *Rivera v. Guerrero*, 4 N.M.I. 79 (1993). Plaintiff Rivera objected to the Commonwealth Ports

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Court notes that at the *in-camera* meeting held on September 17, 2002, Defendants' counsel indicated that the Acting Commissioner's letter of August 1, 2002, would have been considered a "final" decision but for Plaintiff's protest of August 9, 2002.

<sup>5</sup> The CPA regulations regarding protests are similar to PSSPRR § 5-101(1)(a), 19 Com. Reg. 15,443 (Aug. 5, 1997) adopted at 20 Com. Reg. 15,965 (Jun. 15, 1998).

Authority ("CPA") award of a contract to another applicant. CPA regulations<sup>5</sup> provided that a protest could be filed within 10 days from the date Rivera received the CPA's letter of award. Rivera did not submit his letter of protest until 34 days after he received the CPA's letter of award. Four days later, he abandoned his administrative letter of protest and filed a complaint in Superior Court. The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court's dismissal was proper and affirmed. The Court concluded that it "lacks jurisdiction to review an administrative decision not timely appealed during the administrative process." *Id.* at 82.

Because the N.M.I. Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal on grounds of timeliness, the issue of judicial review of a final agency action under the APA was not raised or discussed in *Rivera*. The Supreme Court, however, *in dicta*, discussed the issue at bar, and appears to conclude that if the CPA rejection of Rivera's proposal was deemed final agency action, Rivera would not have had to exhaust his administrative remedies. The N.M.I. Supreme Court stated:

Although the parties did not raise or discuss the issue of finality under the APA, we note that the APA provides for judicial review of "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and *final* agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court." An aggrieved party may seek such review within thirty days after the agency issues its final decision about the matter in question.

In the instant case, CPA's December 24, 1992, notice to Rivera of the rejection of his proposal might or might not be deemed final agency action. If it was a non-final CPA action, then Rivera could not seek review under the APA, which authorizes review only of final agency decisions.

If the December 24, 1992, rejection was a final CPA action, then Rivera had thirty days within which to seek judicial review of the rejection. He would not have had to exhaust his administrative remedy under such circumstances. Rivera, however, did not file his action in court until thirty-nine days after he received notice of the rejection of his proposal. Consequently, even if he could have sought judicial review of the rejection of his proposal as final agency action under the APA, Rivera's court action was untimely.

*Id.* at 84, 85. The N.M.I. Supreme Court's rationale was apparently based on the application of the *Darby* Rule set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court case of *Darby v. Cisneros*, 509 U.S. 137, 113 S. Ct. 2539, 125 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1993), decided a few months before the *Rivera* decision was issued.

The U. S. Supreme Court, in *Darby*, was presented with the question of whether federal courts

have the authority to require that a plaintiff exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review under the United States Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 *et seq.*, where neither the statute nor agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review. *Darby*, 509 U.S. at 138, 113 S. Ct. at 2540, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 117-18. The Court reviewed Section 10(c) of 5 U.S.C. § 704, which is identical to 1 CMC § 9112(d), and held that federal courts, absent statutory authority, were not free to impose appropriate exhaustion requirements. The Court stated that "where the APA applies, an appeal to 'superior agency authority' is a prerequisite to judicial review *only* when expressly required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before review and the administrative action is made inoperative pending that review." *Darby*, 509 U.S. at 154, 113 S. Ct. at 2548, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 127.

Applying the *Rivera* rationale and the *Darby* Rule to the case at bar, the Court finds that there are no statutes or regulations, nor have Defendants offered any, expressly requiring an aggrieved party to appeal an agency decision to "superior agency authority" as a prerequisite to judicial review. Both the CPA Rules and Regulations at issue in *Rivera* and the PSSPRR provide only for permissive or optional protest. PSSPRR at § 5-101(1)(a), 19 Com. Reg. 15,443 (Aug. 5, 1997) adopted at 20 Com. Reg. 15,965 (Jun. 15, 1998), provides in part: "[a]ny actual or prospective bidder, offeror, or contractor who is aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or award of a contract *may* protest to the Commissioner of Education . . . ." (emphasis added). *See* Add. A at 29.

Agencies may avoid the finality of an initial decision, first, by adopting a rule that an agency appeal be taken before judicial review is available, and, second, by providing that the initial decision would be 'inoperative' pending appeal. Otherwise, the initial decision may become final and the aggrieved party is entitled to judicial review.

*Darby*, 509 U.S. at 152, 113 S. Ct. at 2547, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 126. In the instant case, because PSS does not mandate appeal to a superior agency authority, Plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies available to it. Subsections (b) and (d) of 1 CMC § 9112 only require that the agency action at issue be deemed final.

The appropriate inquiry, thus, is whether PSS' correspondences of July 31, 2002, and August 1, 2002, regarding the awarding of contracts under RFP02-004 meet the finality requirement under the APA. The Court in *Darby*, addressed the finality requirement under the APA, by distinguishing it from the

exhaustion requirement when it stated:

The finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.

Darby, 509 U.S. at 144, 113 S. Ct. at 2543, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 121.

The Court went on to add that an agency action is final whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for any form of reconsideration, and suggests that the agency action is final regardless whether a motion for reconsideration has been filed. *Id.* 509 U.S. at 145, 113 S. Ct. at 2544, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 122.

The U.S. Supreme Court in a post-*Darby* decision clarified the finality requirement in *Bennet v*. *Spear*, 520 U.S. 154; 117 S. Ct. 1154, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997). In *Bennet*, the Court stated that two conditions must be satisfied for an agency action to be final: first, the action must mark the "consummation" of the agency's decision making process, and second, the action must be one by which "rights or obligations have been determined," or from which "legal consequences will flow." *Bennet*, 520 U.S. at 178, 117 S. Ct. at 1168, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 305.

Applying the two-prong *Bennet* test to the case at bar, the Court finds that both prongs are met. First, the PSS' July 31, 2002, letter regarding the results of the evaluation of the proposals, the recommendations by appropriate PSS officials and the approvals made by both the Procurement and Supply Officer and the Commissioner through her designee, and the August 1, 2002, letter to Plaintiff advising it of the award do mark the consummation of PSS's decision making process on the proposals submitted under RFP02-004. Second, the August 1, 2002, award letter from PSS to Plaintiff that it was "currently processing a contract" clearly indicate that PSS officials made a decision on the awarding of contracts and that such action has a direct and appreciable legal consequence. Accordingly, the Court finds that the PSS' correspondences at issue meet the definition of "final agency action" and as such, the decision is judicially reviewable pursuant to 1 CMC § 9112(d).

#### V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that this matter is properly before this Court and therefore DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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**SO ORDERED** this 8th day of November 2002. <u>/s/ Virginia S. Sablan-Onerheim</u> VIRGINIA S. SABLAN-ONERHEIM, Associate Judge